Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons
War Crimes Memoranda

War Crimes

2004

Is there a basis for the argument that the detainees at
Guantanamo bay are entitled to constitutional protections?
Mark Pustay

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/war_crimes_memos
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Pustay, Mark, "Is there a basis for the argument that the detainees at Guantanamo bay are entitled to
constitutional protections?" (2004). War Crimes Memoranda. 185.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/war_crimes_memos/185

This Memo is brought to you for free and open access by the War Crimes at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in War Crimes Memoranda by an authorized
administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

____________________________________________________
CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES RESEARCH LAB
____________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

ISSUE: IS THERE A BASIS FOR THE ARGUMENT THAT
THE DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO BAY ARE ENTITLED
TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS?

PREPARED BY MARK PUSTAY
FALL 2004

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents …............................................................................................1
Table of Authorities ………………………………………………………........3
Introduction and Summary of Conclusions ………………………………………..7

- Summary of Conclusions ……………………………………………………...8
1) General Protections Provided to All ………………………………………..9
A. Domestic Law Through the Federal Court System
B. International Law
a. ICCPR
b. Convention Against Torture
2) Citizen Detainees …………………………………………………………20
A. Status
a. Summary
b. Ex Parte Milligan
c. Ex Parte Quirin
d. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
B. Protections
a. Domestic Law
b. International Law
C. Arguments
3) Members of the Taliban Captured in Afghanistan …………………………29
A. Status of Detainees
a. Domestic Law
1. Johnson v. Eisentrager
2. Rasul v. Bush
b. International Law
1. Summary
2. Prisoners of War
B. Protections
a. Domestic Law
1. Ex Parte Milligan
2. Johnson v. Eisentrager
3. In re Yamashita

1

b. International Law
1. Summary
2. Geneva Conventions
4) Al Qaeda Members in Afghanistan ………………………………………..40
A. Status
a. Domestic Law
1. Summary
b. International Law
1. Summary
2. Geneva Conventions
B. Protections
a. Domestic Law
1. Rasul v. Bush
b. International Law
1. Summary
2. Geneva Conventions
3. ICCPR
C. Arguments
5) Al Qaeda Members Captured Abroad of Extradited from Other Territories ..51
A. Status
a. Domestic Law
1. Summary
2. President’s Military Order of November 13, 2001
b. International Law
1. Summary
2. Geneva Convention (IV)
B. Protections
a. Domestic Law
1. Summary
2. President’s Military Order of November 13, 2001
b. International Law
1. Summary
2. Geneva Conventions
C. Arguments

2

STATUTES
1. 28 U.S.C. §2241
2. 10 U.S.C.S. §801 (2004)
3. 10 U.S.C.S. §836 (2004)
4. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2004).
5. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), 115 Stat 224 (2001).
6. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2
7. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
8. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
9. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (III),
art. 4. and Geneva Convention Relative to Protection of Cviilian Persons
in Time of War (IV)
10. The President’s Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg.
57833

CASE LAW
11. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948)
12. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky. 410 U.S. 484 (1973)
13. Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F.Cas. 144 (1861)
14. Ex Parte Milligan, 41 U.S. 2, (1866).
15. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, (1942).
16. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F.Supp.887 (1985)
3

17. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (1980)
18. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633 (2004).
19. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)
20. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
21. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
22. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686, (2004)
23. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S.Ct. 2711 (2004)

LAW REVIEW ARTICLES
24. Jeffrey S. Becker, A Legal War on Terrorism: Extending New York v.
Quarles and the Departre from Enemy Combatant Designations, 53
DePaul L. Rev. 831 (2003)
25. Hon. Robinson O Everett, The Law of War: Military Tribunals and the
War on Terrorism, 48 – DEC Fed. Law. 20 (2001)
26. Anne English French, Trials in Times of War: Do the Bush Military
Commissions Sacrifice Our Freedoms?, 63 Ohio St. L.J. 1225, 12781282 (2002/2003).
27. James Gathii, Torture, Extraterritoriality, Terrorism, and International
Law, 67 ALB. L. REV. 335, 349 (2003).
28. Jack Goldsmith, Should International Human Rights Law Trump US
Domestic Law?, 1 Chi. .J. Int’l L. 327
29. Thomas J. Lepri, Safeguarding the Enemy Within: The Need for
Procedural Protections for U.S. Citizens detained as Enemy Combatants
Under Ex Parte Quirin, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 2565 (2003)

4

30. Daryl A. Mundis, Agora: Military Commissions: The Use of Military
Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts, 96
A.J.I.L. 320
31. Sean D. Murphy, Decision Not to Regard Persons Detained in
Afghanistan as POW’s, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 475, 476-77 (2002).
32. Jordan J. Paust, Anti-Terrorism Military Commissions: Courting
Illegality, 23 Mich. J. Int’l. L 1, 12 (2001).
33. Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status After 9/11: Attacks on the Laws
of War, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 325, 325-28 (2003).
34. Steven R. Swanson, Enemy Combatants and the Writ of Habeas Corpus,
35 Ariz. St. L.J. 939, 968-69 (2003)

NEWSPAPER ARTICLES
35. Guantanamo Farce, Los Angeles Times, September 2, 2004
36. Rights of Detainees, The Guardian, August 13, 2004
37. The Tribunals Begin, The Washington Post, August 29, 2004
38. Wrongly Held at Gitmo, Miami Herald, September 10, 2004

BOOKS
39. BARRY E. CARTER, et al. International Law (2003). (excerpts included).
40. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, All the Laws but One, 128-129 (1998).
41. John M. Rogers, International Human Rights Law and U.S. Law, 107121, 112, in MARK GIBNEY ED., World Justice? U.S. Courts and
International Human Rights (1991).

5

42. Barbara Stark, US Ratification of the Other Half of the International Bill
of Rights, in DAVID P. FORSYTH, ED., The United States and Human
Rights: Looking Inward and Outward, 84 (2000).
OTHER
43. Background Paper on Geneva Conventions and Persons Held by U.S.
Forces, Human Rights Watch, 3, (2002).
44. Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No.1, (Mar. 21,
2002)
45. Frederic L. Kirgis, Distinctions Between International and U.S. Foreign
Relations Law Issues Regarding Treatment of Suspected Terrorists,
ASIL, (June 2004).
46. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper on U.S.
Military Commissions, (Jun 25, 2003).
47. Human Rights, Watch, U.S.: Commission Rules Meet Some, Not All
Rights Concerns, (Mar. 21 2002)
48. International Law in Brief, ASIL (July 9, 2004).

6

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions1

This memorandum addresses the validity of the argument that detainees currently
being
held at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba are afforded certain protections under
the United States Constitution. Part I of this memorandum gives a brief summary of the
protections provided to all persons standing before military commissions, regardless of
status or nationality. Part II considers how domestic and international law deals with the
detention and prosecution of American citizens before military commissions. Part III
addresses the distinction between Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees captured in
Afghanistan, and how the law treats the two groups differently. Finally, part IV assesses
the special situation surrounding the detention of members of Al Qaeda who have been
captured in areas other than Afghanistan. Each section consist of a brief evaluation of the
status classifications given to each type of detainee, an examination of domestic and
international law relevant to the classification, and an assessment of the relative validity
of the various arguments surrounding the treatment of each type of detainee.
Summary of Conclusions
1. There is a legal basis throughout American legal history to justify the
constitutionality of American use of military commissions.
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the ability of the United States to conduct
military commissions in times of national security. International law provides less
approval for the use of American-style military commissions.
2. There is very clear difference in the domestic protections afforded American
citizens and those protections afforded non-citizen aliens.
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3. American courts recognize a wide range of constitutional protections afforded
American citizens.
American courts, as will be evidenced throughout this paper, have made clear distinctions
between citizens and non-citizens when it comes to the constitutional protections
explicitly provided for in domestic law mechanisms.
4. Domestic law affords non-citizen aliens much fewer constitutional protections,
although non-citizen aliens are afforded some limited constitutional protection.
Since the tenets of treaties to which the United States is a party are incorporated in the
Constitution as the law of the land, there are very real constitutional protections that must
be afforded members of the international community. These protections are somewhat
limited, however, in that they are not as expansive as those constitutional protections
afforded citizens of the United States. Non-citizens are afforded the ability to bring suit
in American courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act and, under certain circumstances,
may petition for a writ of habeas corpus review in the federal court system. That said,
there are definite protections afforded non-citizens that arise to the level of constitutional
protections through incorporation. These can be found through an analysis of the Geneva
Conventions, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and the Convention
Against Torture.
5. Certain provisions of international law are incorporated as constitutional
protections.
Article VI, clause two of the Constitution clearly provides that the provisions of
international treaties to which the United States is a party are incorporated as the highest
laws of the land. The extent to which customary international law or non-binding treaties
are binding as constitutional protections is somewhat less clear.
6. There is a clear distinction between the protections afforded detainees under
domestic law and those protections that may be afforded detainees under
international law.
Generally speaking, the domestic protections afforded individuals detained by the United
States are not as expansive as those provided by provisions of international law. Such
provisions of international law may bind the United States if they arise to the highest law
of the land.
7. The United States has taken a number of positive actions to ensure that as many
protections are afforded the individuals detained pursuant to the War on Terror.
The United States has taken some positive steps to ensure that detainees are given
minimum protections of international human rights law, but there still may be a few
legitimate concerns about the ultimate protections afforded those detainees

8

1) General Protections Provided to All
A. Domestic Law Through the Federal Court System

It is difficult to determine the scope of protections afforded detainees under military
commissions, as the protections for the accused are subject to change at the President’s
will.2 The American legal system makes distinctions between citizens and non-citizens
for the purpose of determining what rights and privileges are afforded each member of
society. While the Constitutional protections for citizens are much greater in scope than
those protections afforded non-citizens, there are certain constitutional protections
afforded all people in the United States.
First, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, and recently affirmed, that the ability to
petition for a writ of habeas corpus review is a protection for all people within the
“territorial jurisdiction” of the United States.3 Recent decisions by the Court indicate that
the writ of habeas corpus may be extended to foreign nationals captured abroad, not just
to those foreign nationals within the territorial jurisdiction of United States.4 This ability
to petition for habeas corpus review is subject to prohibition by congressional action.5

2

James Gathii, Torture, Extraterritoriality, Terrorism, and International Law, 67 ALB. L. REV. 335, 349
(2003). [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab 27].
4

Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 2698. [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab 22]. The Court
invokes Section 2241 of the US Code to determine that non-citizen detainees are entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus in challenging their detentions. [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab 1]. This is the
same section of the US Code relied upon by the Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, in which the Court determined that
citizen detainees were not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. See also Braden v. 30th Judicial Court of
Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973) (holding that a prisoner need not necessarily be in the territorial jurisdiction
of a district court in order for that district court to exercise federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.) [Reproduced
in the accompanying textbook at Tab 12].
5

28 U.S.C. §2241. See also Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S.Ct. 2711 (2004) (holding that habeas corpus
jurisdiction of a citizen detainee was limited to the district in which the detainee was confined, not the
Southern District of New York), [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab 23] and Ahrens v.

9

Second, non-resident aliens are entitled to bring civil action in United States District
Court through the Alien Tort Claims Act (the “ATCA”).6 The ATCA provides original
jurisdiction for district courts in cases where an alien brings a “civil action for a tort
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”7 The
ATCA’s authority was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in the Rasul v. Bush
decision of 2004.8 In coming to the conclusion that non-citizen detainees are entitled to
bring civil action in district court, the Rasul Court explicitly stated that the fact that the
persons bringing suit are held in military custody is “immaterial” to issue of whether or
not district courts have jurisdiction over such tort claims.9

B. International Law

Any examination of the protections afforded the Guantanamo detainees that does not
address provisions of international law would be improper. This is because the judicial
branch has clearly indicated that terms of international law can be legally binding
authority for American courts. The United States Constitution has explicitly designated
international treaties made “under the authority of the United States “as the “supreme
Law of the Land.”10 Provisions of international law beyond treaties to which the United
States is a party may also apply to American judicial proceedings. The Supreme Court
Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948) (holding that a detainee’s presence in a particular territory places the detainee
in that territory’s jurisdiction) [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab 11].
6

Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2004). [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab 4]

7

Id.

8

Rasul, supra note 3

9

Rasul, supra note 3, at 2699.

10

U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab 6]

10

declared in the Paquete Habana case that “(i)nternational law is part of American law,”
in holding that international law exempted fishing vessels from being captured as prizes
of war.11 Significantly, the Paquete Habana court declared that in cases “where there is
no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or juricial decision, resort must
be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.”12 Frederic Kirgis argues that the
United States sees international law and United States foreign relations law are
“overlapping, side-by-side legal systems.”13 In one sense, the two systems overlap
because international law can becomes domestic law through incorporation pursuant to
article VI of the Constitution. In another sense, since international law and domestic law
also exist side-by-side, official action that is lawful under U.S. federal law…could be
unlawful under international law.”14

11

The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab 21].
For a contemporary interpretation of the Paquete Habana case, see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876
(1980) (holding that intentional torture was a violation of “universally accepted norms of international
law”) [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab 17].and Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622
F.Supp.887 (1985) (holding that detained aliens invited to the United States by the President were entitled
to hearings because there was no “controlling legislative act” that precluded the court from applying norms
of customary international law) [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab 16].

12

Id. While it is clear that this passage establishes an application of international law to domestic cases
where no specific law controls, the authority of international law in regards to the jurisdiction of military
commissions is unclear. Anne English French argues that since Congress has not passed a statute explicitly
defining the official jurisdiction of military commissions, international law, and particularly the “law of
war” controls the jurisdiction of military commissions. The President’s Military order of November 13,
however, declares that the military commissions conducted pursuant to his order shall have jurisdiction
over non-US citizens where there is reason to believe the accused persons were members of Al-Qaeda,
“engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit” acts of international terrorism, or has harbored
someone who engaged in such activity. A detainee may also be subject to a military commission where “it
is in the interest of the United States.” The exact boundaries of these jurisdictional provisions, however,
cannot be determined, as the President may determine new jurisdictional boundaries for the commissions
“from time to time.”

13

Frederic L. Kirgis, Distinctions Between International and U.S. Foreign Relations Law Issues Regarding
Treatment of Suspected Terrorists, ASIL, June 2004. [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab
45].
14

Id.

11

There are two ways that the United States may be held bound to provisions of
international law. The first way the United States can be bound to international law is
through treaties to which the United States is a party. These treaties include the Geneva
Conventions, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Not only is the United States bound to the provisions of
those treaties, but also the substantive law of those treaties is incorporated in the United
States Constitution as the “supreme law of the land.”15 The second way the United States
is bound to tenets of international law is if those tenets are so widely practiced that those
tenets rise to the level of customary international law. Fort the purposes of the
Guantanamo proceedings, the United States could potentially be bound to provisions of
international law through either of these concepts. It has been argued that regardless of
the designation given to the accused Taliban and Al-Qaeda members captured in
Afghanistan, tenets of both international humanitarian law and international human rights
law affords the detainees at least a minimum of protections.16
To put it succinctly, international law “recognizes that all human beings are entitled
to a bottom line of human dignity.”17 The minimum protections that must be given to
“unprivileged combatants” can be divided into three distinct areas of protection: “lawful

15

U.S. CONST. , supra note 10.

16

BARRY E. CARTER, ET AL. International Law 1119 (2003). [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook
at Tab 39]. This book attributes this argument to Robert K. Goldman and Brian D. Tittemore, Unprivileged
Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian
and Human Rights Law (2002). Excerpts from this book will be analyzed in the form that they are
reprinted in the Carter text.
17

Barbara Stark, US Ratification of the Other Half of the International Bill of Rights, in David P. Forsyth,
The United States and Human Rights: Looking Inward and Outward, 84 (2000). [Reproduced in the
accompanying textbook at Tab 42]
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detention, humane treatment, and fair trial guarantees.”18 These protections arise out of
not only those treaties to which the United States is a party, but also out of certain tenets
of international humanitarian and human rights law that have become so fundamental as
to constitute binding customary international law.19 Beyond the potential legal
obligations arising out of international law, following international law has inherent
benefits in that it is good policy to build international alliances through collective respect
of international rule of law.20
Under the Geneva Conventions, every detainee must be given some sort of legal
status.21 It is the detainee’s legal status that determines the protections afforded the
detainee under international law.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
The United States is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and as a party, the United States must comply with the provisions of the
Covenant. The United States must comply with Article 14 of the ICCPR in determining

18

Robert K. Goldman and Brian D. Tittemore, cited in Carter, supra note 16, at 1117.

19

See generally Goldman and Tittemore, cited in Carter, supra note 16, at 1116-19. Again, it should be
emphasized that article VI, clause two of the United States Constitution incorporates such international
obligations into domestic law. Goldman and Tittemore summarize the United States’ obligations arising out
of international law very well: “That the United States must afford certain minimum human rights
protections to unprivileged enemy combatants who fall into its hands in the course of an international
armed conflict is dictated by treaty and customary norms to which it is bound under international human
rights and humanitarian law…” (Cited in Carter supra note 16, at 1116).

20

See generally Anne English French, Trials in Times of War: Do the Bush Military Commissions Sacrifice
Our Freedoms?, 63 Ohio St. L.J. 1225, 1278-1282 (2002/2003). [Reproduced in the accompanying
textbook at Tab 26]

21

Background Paper on Geneva Conventions and Persons Held by U.S. Forces, Human Rights Watch, 3,
(2002), available at http:// www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/pow-bck.pdf. [Reproduced in the
accompanying textbook at Tab 43].

13

the due process rights afforded the detainees at Guantanamo Bay.22 It is through
incorporation of this article that the Guantanamo detainees may be afforded the most
expansive protections under the United States Constitution.23 Among these protections
would include equality before the court,24 a fair and public hearing before an impartial
tribunal,25 the presumption of innocence,26 and the right to appeal a conviction to some
higher authority.27
Perhaps the most significant international law protections due the detainees are
found in Section three of Article 14 of the ICCPR.28 Section three provides that
“everyone shall be entitled” to certain “minimum guarantees, in full equality.”29
Incorporation of this section of the ICCPR would mean that the detainees at Guantanamo
are entitled to the minimum guarantees of the right to be informed promptly in a language
which the detainee understands,30 the right to communicate with “counsel of his own
choosing,”31 the right to be tried without undue delay,32 the right to defend oneself in
22

Jordan J. Paust, Anti-Terrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 Mich. J. Int’l. L 1, 12
(2001) [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab 32].

23

U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 10. Again, the fact that the United States is a party to the treaty
incorporates the provisions of the treaty as the “highest law of the land” under article VI, clause 2 of the
Constitution.
24

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), art. 14, §1. [Reproduced in the
accompanying textbook at Tab 8].

25

Id., at art. 14, §1.

26

Id., at art. 14, §2.

27

Id., at art. 14, §5.

28

Id., at art. 14, §3.

29

ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 14, §3.

30

ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 14, §3(a).

31

ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 14, §3(b).
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person,33 the right to examine witnesses,34 the right to an interpreter if needed,35 and the
right to be free from being compelled to testify against oneself.36 These minimum
protections of due process are afforded all people in all circumstances by customary
international law.37
While the ICCPR seeks to protect the rights provided through all of article
fourteen, the language of section three of article fourteen would seem to indicate that a
state could be in accordance article fourteen without providing for all the rights contained
therein. While section three is meant to apply to all people in all sections, the designation
of such privileges as “minimum guarantees” would seem to imply that compliance with
section three would be sufficient to satisfy to article fourteen as a whole.
Beyond article fourteen, the detainees are afforded certain rights and privileges under
article nine of the ICCPR. Article nine provides that persons shall be afforded the right
not to be subjected to arbitrary detention and that if such person is detained, that person
must be brought before a judicial body “within a reasonable time” or the person must be
released.38

32

ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 14, §3(c).

33

ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 14, §3(d).

34

ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 14, §3(e).

35

ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 14, §3(f).

36

ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 14, §3(g).

37

Jordan J. Paust, supra note 22. See also Daryl A. Mundis, Agora: Military Commissions: The Use of
Military Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts, 96 A.J.I.L. 320, 324 (“Article 14
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights…is the most important human rights treaty
provision governing due process rights.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab 30].

38

ICCPR supra note 24, art. 9
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There may be other provisions of the ICCPR that may apply to the Guantanamo
detainees as well. In particular, the United States may be held to the provisions of article
seven of the ICCPR, which provides protections from “torture” or “cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.”39 In regards to the ICCPR as a whole, there are a
number of provisions in the ICCPR that are more expansive than domestic law. To that
end, there are legitimate reasons for not incorporating every provision of the ICCPR.40
Article nine and article fourteen, section three are the exceptions to that rule. The
protections of article nine and article fourteen, section three are necessary for the United
States to fulfill its’ international obligations. As such, since the United States is a party to
the ICCPR, the United States would at the very least have to apply the provisions of at
least section three of article fourteen to the Guantanamo detainees.

Torture

The Convention Against Torture was adopted by member-states of the United
Nations on December 10, 1984.41 The Convention Against Torture was adopted with the
intent to “make more effective the struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman or

39

ICCPR supra note 24, art. 7.

40

See Jack Goldsmith, Should International Human Rights Law Trump US Domestic Law?, 1 Chi. .J. Int’l
L. 327, 332 for background on the consequences of complete incorporation of the ICCPR. Goldsmith
argues that “a domesticated ICCPR would generate enormous litigation and uncertainty, potentially
damaging domestic civil rights law in manifold ways. Human rights protections in the United States are
not remotely so deficient as to warrant these costs.” (Id.) [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at
Tab 28].

41

Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Convention Against Torture, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (December 10, 1984). [Reproduced in the accompanying
textbook at Tab 7]. The United States is a party to the Torture Convention.
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degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world.”42 Unfortunately, there is the
very real potential that the Guantanamo detainees are victims of acts of torture, and
subjecting them to such acts of torture comes with significant legal consequences. With
regard to the present situation, there are some provisions of the Torture Convention that
speak directly to the treatment of detained persons, specifically articles two, twelve,
thirteen, fourteen and sixteen.
Article two may be of particular interest because it addresses the applicability of
the Torture Convention in times of “exceptional circumstances.”43 Even where a state
faces “exceptional circumstances,” there is no such exceptional circumstance that allows
a state to justify the invocation of torture.44
Articles twelve, thirteen and fourteen clarify the “due process” and investigative
limitations of the Torture Convention. States are obligated to ensure that a full and
impartial investigation is conducted in situations where there is “reasonable ground to
believe” that torture has been committed in its territory.45 Under article thirteen, states
are required to ensure that complaining persons have the ability to initiate such an
impartial investigation into the alleged acts of torture.46 States are further obligated under
article thirteen to ensure that when such an impartial investigation has been initiated, the
complaining party is not subject to any sort of intimidation that results from the person
42

Id.

43

Id. Potential “exceptional circumstances” which a state could conceivably claim a (non-existent)
exception might include “a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public
emergency.” Id.

44

Id..

45

Id. at art. 12.

46

Convention Against Torture, supra note 41, art. 13.
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bringing the complaint against the accused state.47 Article fourteen ensures that the
judicial proceedings that are conducted pursuant to a torture complaint result in full
redress and adequate compensation for victims of torture.48
Not only are states are obligated under articles twelve, thirteen and fourteen to
conduct impartial investigations and ensure fair judicial proceedings for victims of
torture, but states are obligated to take preventative actions to ensure that acts of torture
are not taking place within territories under the states’ jurisdiction.49
While the United States is obligated to comply with the provisions of the Torture
Convention, the Convention is facially not intended to pre-empt any domestic law
prohibiting the imposition of torture within lands under the state’s jurisdiction. The
second clause of article sixteen of the Torture Convention notes that the provisions of the
Convention “are without prejudice to the provisions of any other international instrument
or national law which prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”50
While the legal significance of international law is debatable, the diplomatic
importance of the treatment of constitutional protections for the Guantanamo detainees is
very significant. While the treatment of Guantanamo detainees may be legally justifiable,
the potential political and diplomatic consequences of the United States’ treatment of the
Guantanamo detainees need to be taken into account. The fact of the matter is that
international law is based in diplomatic relations and these relations are given
significance when the diplomatic relations are bolstered by international legal
47

Convention Against Torture, supra note 41, art. 13.

48

Convention Against Torture, supra note 41, art. 14.

49

Convention Against Torture, supra note 41, art. 16, cl.1.

50

Convention Against Torture, supra note 41, art. 16, cl.2.

18

obligations.51 A failure of the rule of law in a state with the premier status that the United
States currently holds leaves international diplomacy and the legal bases thereof, in
serious trouble. While the policy bases behind international law is not a binding
argument, international diplomacy is the most important external consideration in
determining the constitutional rights afforded the Guantanamo Bay detainees.

51

John M. Rogers, International Human Rights Law and U.S. Law, 107-121, 112, in Mark Gibney ed.,
World Justice? U.S. Courts and International Human Rights (1991).
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2) Citizen Detainees
A. Status52
Summary
While American courts had considered the legality of military commissions in earlier
cases,53 the Supreme Court did not attempt to define the status of citizens facing military
commissions until the Ex Parte Milligan decision in 1866.54 Before the Hamdi decision,
American courts had only addressed the legal status of citizens facing military
commissions in a few cases, and even then American courts had not come to an official
consensus. The Hamdi decision upheld the Government’s ability to hold citizen
detainees as “enemy combatants.”

Ex Parte Milligan
The Milligan case addressed the arrest and detention of an attorney from Indiana who
was tried before a military commission on “certain charges and specifications.”55 In

52

The President’s Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833, [Reproduced in the
accompanying textbook at Tab 10] only applies to individuals who are not United States citizens, so
citizens cannot be detained pursuant to the President’s Military Order of November 13, 2001. It is
necessary to discuss citizen detainees, however, in the event that citizens are detained pursuant to other
statutory authorities. Furthermore, as the Hamdi case exhibits, there have been citizens of the United States
held at Guantanamo Bay. Also, since this section deals with how the United States classifies it’s own
citizen detainees, there is no need to examine international law in this section.

53

The use of military commissions in American history dates all the way back to the Revolutionary War,
but until the Milligan case, citizens before military tribunals were referred to as “prisoners” and nothing
else. See Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F.Cas. 144 (1861) [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab
13]. See also 10 USCS §801 (2004) (regarding general provisions for military law under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice) [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab 2] and Hon. Robinson O Everett,
The Law of War: Military Tribunals and the War on Terrorism, 48 – DEC Fed. Law. 20 (2001) (outlining
the use of military courts throughout American history, with an eye to the war on terror) [Reproduced in the
accompanying textbook at Tab 25].
54

Ex Parte Milligan, 41 U.S. 2, 107 (1866). [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab 14].

55

Id.
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determining the legality of subjecting the petitioner to trial before a military commission,
the Supreme Court did make an explicit decision concerning the petitioner’s status under
the law, but the Court did determine what status the petitioner could not be given. The
Milligan Court determined that a civilian citizen of a non-rebellious state who was
captured in that State could not be considered a “prisoner of war,” despite the fact that the
petitioner’s activities were seen as aiding the rebellion.56

Ex Parte Quirin
Although the Quirin decision dealt with the detentions of members of the German
Military captured on American soil, the Quirin Court was the first to extend the phrase
“enemy belligerents” to citizens of the United States.57 The Quirin Court had already
determined that the foreign petitioners were enemies from a “belligerent” nation. That
said, the Court continued its analysis by holding that mere citizenship in the United States
does not preclude the Government from labeling the citizen as an enemy belligerent:
“Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the
consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in violation of the law of
war.”58 While this discussion of the application of the enemy belligerent status to

56

Id. at 204-05. The Court classified the petitioner as “not a resident of one of the rebellious states, or a
prisoner of war, but a citizen of Indiana for twenty years past, and never in the military or naval service…”
Id.
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Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1942). [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab 15].
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Id.
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American citizens is extraneous to the Quirin Court’s decision, the Court seems to have
gone out of its way to hold that the enemy belligerent status may extend to citizens.59
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
While the President’s Military Order of November 13, 2001 only applies to noncitizens, certain citizen detainees have been held pursuant to other statutory authorities.
Yaser Hamdi is one such citizen. Born an American citizen in 1980, Hamdi was captured
by members of the Northern Alliance during the Afghan military campaign in late 2001.60
Hamdi was held in Afghanistan pursuant, not to the President’s Military Order of
November 13, 2001, but to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (the “AUMF”).61
The Supreme Court upheld the authorization to detain certain individuals pursuant to the
AUMF.62
Once Hamdi had been captured, the Government designated Hamdi an “enemy
combatant.” The Hamdi Court notes that while the Government has not clearly defined
what an “enemy combatant” actually is, the Government is authorized to hold such

59

See Thomas J. Lepri, Safeguarding the Enemy Within: The Need for Procedural Protections for U.S.
Citizens detained as Enemy Combatants Under Ex Parte Quirin, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 2565 (2003) (for an
examination of Ex Parte Quirin in light of the recent Rumsfeld v. Padilla decision) [Reproduced in the
accompanying textbook at Tab 29].
60
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2635 (2004) [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab 18].
61

Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), 115 Stat 224 (2001) [Reproduced in the accompanying
textbook at Tab 5]. Section Two of the AUMF provides in relevant part: “That the President is authorized
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against
the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” Id.
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Hamdi, supra note 60, at 2639-40 (2004) (concluding, in part, that “the AUMF is explicit
congressional authorization for the detention of individuals…” Id.
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“enemy combatants” pursuant to the AUMF.63 The “enemy combatant” designation was
the latest reincarnation of the “enemy belligerent” designation originally extended to
citizens in Ex Parte Quirin.64 The Hamdi decision upheld the Government’s ability to
hold citizen detainees as “enemy combatants.”

B. Protections
Domestic Law
Ex Parte Milligan
Five years later, in Ex parte Milligan, the Supreme Court outlined the limits on
executive power that exist through the United States Constitution. The majority made
two key findings: first, the majority found that the trial of Milligan by military
commission was an unconstitutional violation of the Sixth Amendment; and second, the
majority found that Constitutional protections applied equally in war and in peace, and
covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all
circumstances.”65
In regards to due process, the Milligan Court is famous for it’s strong language
regarding the protections afforded citizens facing criminal charges: “All other persons,
citizens of states where the courts are open, if charged with crime, are guaranteed the
inestimable privilege of trial by jury. This privilege is a vital principle, underlying the
whole administration of criminal justice; it is not held by sufferance, and cannot be
63

Hamdi, supra note 60, at 2639 (2004). The only definition the Court comes to is that an enemy
combatant is an individual “, it alleges, was ‘part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or
coalition partners’ in Afghanistan and who 'engaged in an armed conflict against the United States'" there.’”
Id. quoting Brief for Respondents, 3.

64

Quirin, supra note 57, at 37-38.
Ex Parte Milligan, 41 U.S. 2, 1, 121-22, 214 (1866). See also WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, All the Laws but
One, 128-129 (1998).
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frittered away on any plea of state or political necessity.”66 The applicability of the
Milligan case, however, to the Guantanamo detainees is questionable at best. The
Milligan case only dealt with the rights and protections afforded American citizens, and
the Court did not contemplate how the opinion would change if Milligan was a noncitizen. That said, Ex Parte Milligan is helpful to highlight where the law concerning the
constitutional rights of persons facing military commissions originated.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
The Hamdi case is the latest in a deep well of case law that has tried to define the
limits of constitutional protections for citizen detainees. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the
Supreme Court held that an American citizen-detainee captured during the military
campaign in Afghanistan is entitled to certain protections of due process.67 The Hamdi
court begins to clarify the contemporary due process guarantees afforded citizen
detainees at Guantanamo Bay, although this is open for debate. For example, while the
Court addresses Hamdi’s constitutional protections pursuant to his status as an American
citizen, the Court does not address how the analysis would change if the Hamdi were not
an American citizen. Furthermore, the Hamdi Court does not explicitly address how their
findings would be altered if Hamdi was held at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, which is
66

Milligan, supra note 65, at 214.

67

Hamdi, supra note 60, at2647 (2004). See also 28 U.S.C.A.§2243 (rules regarding the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus). Rights of Detainees, The Guardian, August 13, 2004 (supporting the Supreme Court’s
decision to allow detainees to challenge the validity od their detentions in the American judicial system)
[Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab 36].
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under United States jurisdiction but Cuban sovereignty, rather than being held in South
Carolina.68 In this sense, the Hamdi case is somewhat limited in applicability to the
status of non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo Bay. The Hamdi decision, however, does
highlight that there is a case to be made for certain constitutional protections to be
afforded to certain detainees. What those protections actually consist of requires some
examination
In the Hamdi case, the Supreme Court makes it very clear that there are some
constitutional protections afforded citizen detainees pursuant to their status as American
citizens. First, the Court gives guarded authorization of the detention of citizen
combatants. The Court determines that there is no barrier to prevent the United States
from holding an American citizen as an enemy combatant,69 the Court cautions that in
American “society liberty is the norm, and detention without trial is the carefully limited
exception.”70 Even though the Hamdi Court authorizes that ability to detain citizens who
are declared enemy combatants, the Court does make it clear that a citizen detainee is
entitled to a writ of habeas corpus absent a declaration by Congress suspending habeas
corpus.71
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International Law in Brief, ASIL (July 9, 2004) at http://asil.org/ilib/ilib0712.htm. [Reproduced in the
accompanying textbook at Tab 48]. The United States occupies the land on which the Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base sits pursuant to a Lease Agreement between the United States and Cuba in 1903 following the
Spanish-American War (Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 23 1903, U.S. Cuba, art. III,
T.S. No. 418).
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Hamdi, supra note 60, at 2640.
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Hamdi, supra note 60, at 2646 (italics added by author) citing United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095,
at 2105.
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Hamdi, supra note 60, at 2650-51. There is nothing at this moment to suggest that Congress has
suspended the writ of habeas corpus for citizen-detainees.
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Further defining the privileges under the writ of habeas corpus, the Hamdi Court
addressed the procedural privileges afforded to citizen detainees under the Constitution.
First and foremost, citizen detainees entitled to the writ of habeas corpus must be
presented with facts supporting their classification as enemy combatants as well as given
an opportunity to challenge those factual bases: a “citizen-detainee seeking to challenge
his classification as an enemy combatant notice of the factual basis for his classification,
and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral
decisionmaker.”72 Part of this habeas corpus opportunity to rebut the Government’s case
includes the detainee’s opportunity to present facts and rebut assertions presented the
Government against one’s classification.73 Additionally, the Court declares that the
opportunity to challenge the factual bases for one’s detention should be afforded the
citizen detainee “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”74 The Court
justifies these privileges by declaring that the right to be heard at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner is an essential principle of procedural due process.75
These due process protections, however, are not unlimited as the Hamdi court notes.
The Court recognizes that the due process rights afforded citizen detainees are subject to
72

Hamdi, supra note 60, at 2648.
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Hamdi, supra note 60, at 2644. See also 28 U.S.C. §2241(c) for further guidance. [Reproduced in the
accompanying textbook at Tab 1]. Section 2241(c) of the United States Code provides:“(c) The writ of
habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless -- (1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority
of the United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or (2) He is in custody for an act
done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or
judge of the United States; or (3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States; or (4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in custody for an act
done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under
the commission, order or sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect of
which depend upon the law of nations;” 28 U.S.C. §2241 (2004).
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Hamdi, supra note 60, at 2648.
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Hamdi, supra note 60, at 2648-49.
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limits imposed by the judiciary, 76 provided that such limits do not offend the
fundamental principles of due process.77 These limits may include the increased
admissibility of certain types of evidence or altering the presumption of innocence to
favor the Government’s evidence. In times where the “exigencies of the circumstances”
demand that the proceedings afforded citizen-detainees be altered, the Court recognizes
that there are clearly limits that may be placed on these judicial proceedings: “Hearsay,
for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the
Government in such a proceeding. Likewise, the Constitution would not be offended by
a presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence, so long as…fair opportunity for
rebuttal were provided.”78 Any denial of a citizen-detainee’s ability to rebut the
Government’s evidence justifying his or her detention “falls constitutionally short.”79

International Law80
To the extent that notions of sovereignty limit such obligations, the United States
is bound to respect its obligations under international law providing the same protections
to citizens that it must afford non-citizens under the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions, the UN Charter, the ICCPR, and the Convention Against Torture.
Therefore, not only to articles nine and fourteen of the ICCPR as well as the minimum
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Hamdi, supra note 60, at 2644.
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Hamdi, supra note 60, at 2649.

78

Hamdi, supra note 60, at 2649.
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Hamdi, supra note 60, at 2651,
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Whereas it was not necessary to examine international law in regards to the official status of the citizen
detainees, it is necessary to examine international law to determine what protections may be afforded
citizens under international law.
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protections guarantees under the Convention Against Torture apply to non-citizens, but
such provisions also apply to American citizens under the incorporation provisions of
article VI, clause two of the Constitution.81

C. Arguments
The United States makes the claim based on sovereignty and notions of self-rule that
the United States should be allowed to determine what rights to be afforded its own
citizens. To that end, the United States view asserts that domestic case law and domestic
statutory constructions take a preferred position over relevant international law. Under
the international view, the United States cannot do with its citizens as it wishes, as
principles of international human rights law must be respected and celebrated.
Legally speaking, while the United States does have the sovereignty to determine
how to treat its citizens as it wishes, that sovereignty is subject to the limits of
international principles of human rights law. Furthermore, although domestic statutory
constructions are of the highest importance in domestic policy, the United States must
recognize that the provisions of treaties to which the United States is a party are
incorporated as the “supreme law of the land” under article VI, clause two of the
Constitution.82 Therefore, though the United States arguments of sovereignty over its
citizens are legally correct, that sovereignty is subject to principles of international
human rights law and justice.

81

U.S. CONST, supra note 15. The substantive law of those treaties to which the United States is a party is
incorporated in the United States Constitution as the “supreme law of the land.”
82
U.S. CONST. supra note 15.
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3) Members of the Taliban captured in Afghanistan
A. Status of Detainees
The protections afforded the detainees captured in Afghanistan pursuant to American
military operations against the Taliban regime will depend on the official status of those
detainees under both domestic and international law.

Domestic Law
Johnson v. Eisentrager
The Johnson v. Eisentrager decision faced a set of circumstances similar to that
presented before the Quirin Court, but the Eisentrager decision dealt with distinctively
different issues than those dealt with by the Quirin Court. In Eisentrager, an American
military commission sitting in China tried a group of German nationals for violations of
the rules of war.83 The German nationals challenged their detentions in the American
judicial system, petitioning the District Court of the District of Columbia and eventually
arguing their case before the Supreme Court.84
In a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court rejected the detainees’ challenge,
holding that the U.S. Constitution provided no protections for enemy aliens who had
never been within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.85 In coming to their
decision, the Court made critical distinctions between the rights of an alien and the rights
of an American citizen. In determining the rights afforded to an alien, the Court noted
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Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 766 (1950) [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab 20].
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Id., at 765 (1950). The District Court dismissed the detainees’ petition but the Court of Appeals reversed
and reinstated the petition for further proceedings. Id at 767.

85

Id., at 768 (1950).
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that an alien’s rights under the Constitution varied in consideration of a number of
different factors, the most significant of which was the alien’s presence in the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.86 The Court described the range of rights afforded
aliens, noting that trend was to offer aliens more constitutional protections, but that such
rights necessarily began with “the alien’s presence in within (United States) territorial
jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary the power to act.”87

Rasul v. Bush
The Rasul case dealt with two Australian citizens and twelve Kuwaiti citizens
captured by the United States during the military campaign in Afghanistan.88 The
detainees had been held at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base for nearly two years.89 The
detainees claimed that they had never been an enemy combatant against the United
States, had never engaged in terrorist activity against the United States, and had never
been informed of the charges against them.90 The District Court relied on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager in dismissing the detainees’ action.91
Before examining what the Rasul Court says about the detainee’s status, an
important nuance of the Rasul case must be emphasized. First, the Court noted that the
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Id. at 770 (1950).
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Id, at 770 (1950).
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Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 2690 (2004). [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab 22].
Shafiq Rasul, a British citizen who is listed as the primary plaintiff in this case, had been released from
custody before the Supreme Court’s decision.
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Id. at 2691.
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petitioner’s in the Rasul case were not foreign nationals of a country at war with the
United States,92 unlike the members of the Taliban captured in Afghanistan. This means
that to the extent the Rasul decision applies to members of the Taliban captured in
Afghanistan, it applies to such detainees pursuant to their actions as fighting for the
Taliban and not pursuant to their status as Afghan citizens.
This said, the Rasul Court does not go into great detail as to what status enemy
detainees would be given in the event of active hostilities. Since the petitioners claimed
that they were not combatants against the United States, the Court seems to have limited
its examination to jurisdiction over “enemy aliens,” rather than “enemy combatants.” In
fact, the Rasul Court distinguishes the case from the Eisentrager decision in that the
petitioner’s are not nationals of a country at war with the United States and they deny any
wrongdoing against the United States.93
To the extent that domestic law addresses the legal status of foreign nationals
from countries at war with the United States, Johnson v. Eisentrager, holding that such
detainees would be considered “enemy aliens,” controls the issue in regards to domestic
law application.

International Law
Summary
It is from an examination of international law that one can find the most definitive
language regarding the legal status of foreign nationals from enemy states. The official
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Id. at 2690.
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Rasul, supra note 88, at 2693.
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legal status of what detainees captured pursuant to active hostilities with an enemy state
is somewhat unclear.
There are two general types of prisoners under international law. First, there are
“prisoners of war,” who are subject to specific qualifications and are afforded certain
protections under Geneva (III).94 The second general type of prisoner under international
law is “enemy” or “unlawful combatants.” While the terms enemy combatants or
unlawful combatants are not found in the Geneva Conventions, such persons may be
provided certain protections under the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War [“Geneva (IV)”]. 95

Prisoners of War
In a number of instances, persons who are captured fighting in an active war are given
the status of “prisoners of war, ” and are thus covered under Geneva (III). In order to be
considered a prisoner of war, a detainee must satisfy four conditions under Geneva (III):
the detainee would have to be part of a military hierarchy, the detainee would have to
wear uniforms or distinctive signs visible at a distance, the detainee would have to carry
his/her arms openly, and the detainee would have to conducted their operations in
accordance with the laws of war.96 A detainee can also be considered a prisoner of war if
the detainee, upon “the approach of the enemy spontaneously take arms to resist the
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Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (III), art. 4 [Reproduced in the
accompanying textbook at Tab 9]..
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Background Paper on Geneva Conventions and Persons Held by U.S. Forces, Human Rights Watch, 3,
(2002), available at http:// www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/pow-bck.pdf. [Reproduced in the
accompanying textbook at Tab 43].
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Geneva (III), supra note 94, at art. 4, A(2).

32

invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units,
provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws…of war.”97 The language of this
provision would seem to indicate that the provision would apply whether or not the
detainee is an official member of the enemy military. The status of a detainee as a POW
can also be extende to members of militia forces and inhabitants of a non-occupied
territory who take up open arms in order to resist the occupying military.98 In the event
that a detainee’s status is in doubt, the detainee is to enjoy the protections of Geneva (III)
until their status can be determined by a “competent tribunal” such as the United States
Supreme Court or the International Court of Justice.99

B. Protections
Domestic Law
Ex Parte Milligan
In the Milligan case, the Supreme Court forcefully declared that the Constitution
“is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of
its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.”100 Whether
this passage in the Milligan case provides for wide constitutional protections for non-
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Geneva (III), supra note 94, at art. 4, A(6).
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Human Rights Watch, supra note 95.
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Geneva (III), supra note 94, at art. 5.
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Milligan, supra note 54, at 120-21.
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citizens is questionable, as it most likely was not meant to apply to non-citizen “classes of
men.”101

Johnson v. Eisentrager
The Eisentrager court further distinguished the constitutional rights of non-citizen
aliens between those rights afforded “friendly” aliens and those rights afforded “enemy”
aliens. A friendly alien, as the Court describes, is “accorded a generous and ascending
scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society.”102 This “scale of rights”
begins with an “implied assurance of safe conduct” and expands once the friendly alien
expresses intent to seek citizenship.103 From there, the friendly alien’s rights gradually
increase to include due process and other important constitutional protections.104
The Eisentrager Court, however, sees the treatment of enemy aliens as a different
issue altogether. Enemy aliens are subject to executive activity in times of war.105
Resident enemy aliens, during times when war has been declared, are “constitutionally
subject to summary arrest, internment and deportation.106 Furthermore, enemy aliens
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An argument can be made, however, that the passage was meant to extend constitutional protections in
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have no right to a writ of habeas corpus, are not immune from military commissions, and
are not afforded access to the American judicial system.107

In Re Yamashita
The Yamashita Court dealt with the case of a commanding general of the
Japanese Army who was captured by United States forces during World War II.108
Yamashita was tried as an enemy combatant before a military commission, and
Yamashita petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus review.109
In his petition, Yamashita claimed, among other allegations, that the military
commission he was subjected to did not have jurisdiction over him as an alien enemy
combatant.110 The Supreme Court rejected his claim, as it’s holding was focused on the
jurisdiction of the military commission and whether such jurisdiction was acceptable.111
The Court made some extraneous findings, however, passing judgment on Yamashita’s
ability to defend himself. The Court found that an enemy belligerent was entitled the
opportunity to defend himself before a duly convened judicial body and, further, that the
provision of a military commission was not a violation of this right to defend himself.
The Court decided that since he was entitled the right to defend himself, and the military
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commission constituted such an opportunity to present a defense, the military
commission was not a violation of his constitutional right to present a criminal defense.112

International Law
Summary
Although the Constitution provides citizen detainees with a number of protections
under domestic law, there are certain tenets of international law that apply to citizen
detainees as well. Since the United States is a party to the Geneva Conventions, the
United States is bound to treat its own citizens in accordance with the Geneva
Conventions. Furthermore, the ICCPR and the Convention Against Torture provide
certain jus cogens protections that are afforded all people at all times, including citizen
detainees.

Geneva Conventions
Should the Geneva Conventions apply, there are a number of protections that are
afforded detainees who are covered under the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.
Like all treaties to which the United States is a party, these protections arise to the level
of constitutional guarantees.113 The prisoners must be given humane treatment,114 which
includes proper confinement,115 food and clothing,116 and medical care.117 The prisoners
112

Id. at 9.
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36

need to be afforded the opportunity for certain relations with the exterior world.118 Most
importantly, if the detainees at Guantanamo Bay are considered prisoners of war under
the Geneva Conventions, there are certain judicial proceedings guaranteed to the
detainees amounting to international due process.119 Prisoners of war covered under the
Conventions need be released “without delay” after active hostilities have ended.120
There are further protections regarding the imposition of the death penalty. These
protections would include the ability to be informed as soon as possible of which offenses
for which they are accused are punishable by the death penalty121 and the punishments
need be served in the same procedures afforded “members of the armed forces of the
Detaining Power.”122

C. Arguments
In regards to the status of the Taliban detainees at Guantanamo Bay, there has been
some dissension among important parties regarding the correct legal status of said
detainees.
The United States Government has not been altogether clear on what status it has
given the Taliban detainees at Guantanamo Bay. Originally, the United States asserted
116
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that the members of the Taliban captured in Afghanistan were to be regarded as
“unlawful combatants.”123 As time wore on, however, the United States changed it’s
designation of the Taliban detainees to a somewhat undetermined status. Despite the fact
that the United States captured the detainees during active hostilities, the United States
insisted that the Taliban detainees were not “prisoners of war,” and thus not afforded the
protections granted in the Geneva Conventions.124
While the United States has been unclear on the status it feels should be afforded
Taliban detainees, the United States will continue to make the argument that such
detainees are not prisoners of war. The United States will rely heavily on the four
conditions a prisoner of war must satisfy, namely those of military hierarchy, uniform or
discernible mark, open arms, and respect for the laws of war.125 The United States will
claim that status classifications aside, the the Taliban detainees would indeed be afforded
the rights and privileges of prisoners of war.126
Critics of this approach would argue that, under the Geneva Conventions, the United
States cannot unilaterally classify all detainees from a particular conflict as being exempt
from prisoner of war status without some sort of judicial deterimination.127 Furthermore,
critics argue that since the United States has provided doubtful classifications for the
Taliban detainees, they must be considered prisoners of war under Geneva (III).128 These
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critics are skeptical of the claims by the United States that the detainees are afforded the
rights and privileges commensurate with those afforded prisoners of war.
Until a competent tribunal has explicitly determined that the members of the Taliban
captured in Afghanistan are not prisoners of war, the best argument is in favor of those
who insist that the United States must afford the Taliban detainees at Guantanamo Bay
prisoner of war status. Policy considerations aside, Geneva (III) is the controlling law on
this issue, and in the case of doubt, the best argument is that Taliban detainees should be
given prisoner of war status. Therefore, under Geneva (III), the Taliban detainees should
be given a certain degree of humane treatment,129 a trial or release without delay after
hostilities have ended,130 and punishment proportional with those afforded members of
the United States Military.131
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4) Al Qaeda Members in Afghanistan
A. Status
Domestic Law
Summary
The status of Al Qaeda members in Afghanistan is basically one of first
impression for domestic courts. Whereas much of the previous case law had dealt with
enemy belligerents who were representing a particular state, the Al Qaeda detainees were
not fighting in the name of a territory or state. As members of an international terrorist
network, there are serious questions as to whether or not domestic and international law
treat such detainees as “prisoners of war” or as “enemy combatants.”132 International law
provides the best framework for this debate, so it will be most helpful to analyze
exclusively international law on this issue.

International Law
Summary
Whereas domestic law may not provide for specific constitutional protections for
non-citizen detainees, sources of international law may provide certain protections that
arise to the level of constitutional protections through incorporation under article VI,
clause 2 of the Constitution. These sources include potentially applicable provisions of
the Geneva Conventions. Provisions of the ICCPR and the Convention Against Torture,
particularly articles seven, nine and fourteen of the ICCPR, and articles twelve, thirteen,
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fourteen and sixteen of the Convention against Torture, will apply even to non-citizen
members of international terrorist organizations that know no territorial allegiance.

Geneva Conventions (III)
The Geneva Conventions have been recognized as binding international law on
the countries that are parties to the treaty.133 Of particular interest to the present
discussion is the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Since the
United States is a party to the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
the provisions of the Convention are incorporated into the United States Constitution
through clause two of article VI and are thus provisions of domestic law as well as
provisions of international law.134 Therefore, if the Geneva Conventions apply to the
detention of accused members of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions are incorporated into domestic law and are considered part of the potential
constitutional package afforded the Guantanamo detainees.135
A few significant issues have arisen, however, concerning the applicability of the
Geneva Conventions to the detentions at Guantanamo Bay. First, the Geneva
Conventions apply in a case of “declared war or of any other armed conflict which may
133
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arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them.”136 The language extending the applicability of the
Convention to cases of “any other armed conflict” clearly suggests that the provisions of
the Convention apply to more than just cases of “declared war.”137 This means that there
is no requirement that either side declare war, only that “de facto hostilities” exist
between the two parties.138 While there is some doubt as to whether the current
campaigns in Afghanistan constitute major combat operations, it is clear that a de facto
state of hostilities does in fact exist between the United States and terrorist groups
worldwide like Al-Qaeda. Though the United States has argued that detainees who are
accused of being members of Al-Qaeda are not “prisoners of war” covered under the
Geneva Conventions, until the Supreme Court definitively decides that the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay are not considered “prisoners of war,” article five of Geneva III
provides that the detainees might “enjoy the protection of the present Convention until
such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.”139

B. Protections
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Domestic Law
Rasul v. Bush
The Rasul Court focused its’ analysis on whether detainees held in an area under
American jurisdiction but not American sovereignty were entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus. The Court thoroughly analyzed the history of the writ of habeas corpus, noting
“this Court has recognized the federal courts’ power to review applications for habeas
relief in a wide variety of cases involving Executive detention, in wartime as well as in
times of peace.”140 While recognizing that the District Court had invalidated the
detainee’s actions on the basis of the Eisentrager decision, the Supreme Court made clear
distinctions between the Eisentrager case and the Rasul detainees: the Rasul detainees
“are not nationals of countries at war with the United States…they have never
been…charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and for more than two years they have
been imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction
and control.”141 The Supreme Court stated that these distinctions made the Eisentrager
decision distinguishable from the Rasul case. Those distinctions notwithstanding, the
Supreme Court then took it’s analysis a step further. The Supreme Court declared that
decisions filed since the Eisentrager decision had filled a “statutory gap” that had been
present at the time of the Eisentrager decision.142

The Court determined that people

who were “detained outside the territorial jurisdiction of any federal district court no
longer need rely on the constitution as the source of their right to federal habeas
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review.”143 Detainees could now rely on stautory constructions to assert federal courts’
jurisdiction. The Surpreme Court reasoned that this meant the non-citizen detainees could
present habeas corpus challenges to their detentions under § 2241 of the United States
Code.144 In holding that United States District Courts have jurisdiction to hear the cases
of Rasul v. Bush set a precedent declaring that foreign nationals captured outside the
United States may challenge the legality of their detentions through the United States
judicial system.
Furthermore, not only are non-citizen detainees entitled to a writ of habeas corpus
to challenge the legality of their detentions, the Supreme Court makes clear in the Rasul
decision that non-citizen detainees are also entitled to bring civil action in United States
district court.145 This privilege is conferred on nonresident aliens pursuant to the Alien
Tort Claims Act, which provides that district courts have original jurisdiction in cases
where an alien brings a “civil action for a tort committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.”146 In coming to this conclusion, the Supreme
Court explicitly stated that the fact that the persons bringing suit “are being held in
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military custody is immaterial to the question” of whether or not the District Court has
jurisdiction over those tort claims.147

International Law
Summary
If an accused member of Al Qaeda detained at Guantanamo Bay was captured in
Afghanistan, the detainee may be afforded certain protections under the Geneva
Convention (III),148 article 14 of the ICCPR,149 and the Convention Against Torture.

Geneva Conventions
Should the Geneva Conventions apply, there are a number of protections that are
afforded detainees who are covered under the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.
Like all treaties to which the United States is a party, these protections arise to the level
of constitutional guarantees.150 The prisoners must be given humane treatment,151 which
includes proper confinement,152 food and clothing,153 and medical care.154 The prisoners
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need to be afforded the opportunity for certain relations with the exterior world.155 Most
importantly, if the detainees at Guantanamo Bay are considered prisoners of war under
the Geneva Conventions, there are certain judicial proceedings guaranteed to the
detainees amounting to international due process.156 Prisoners of war covered under the
Conventions need be released “without delay” after active hostilities have ended.157
There are further protections regarding the imposition of the death penalty. These
protections would include the ability to be informed as soon as possible of which offenses
for which they are accused are punishable by the death penalty158 and the punishments
need be served in the same procedures afforded “members of the armed forces of the
Detaining Power.”159

ICCPR
The United States must comply with Article 14 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights in determining the due process rights afforded the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay.160 It is through incorporation of this article that the Guantanamo
detainees may be afforded the most expansive protections under the United States
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Constitution.161 Among these protections would include equality before the court,162 a
fair and public hearing before an impartial tribunal,163 the presumption of innocence,164
and the right to appeal a conviction to some higher authority.165
Perhaps the most significant international law protections due the detainees are
found in Section three of Article 14 of the ICCPR.166 Section three provides that
“everyone shall be entitled” to certain “minimum guarantees, in full equality.”167
Incorporation of this section of the ICCPR would mean that the detainees at Guantanamo
are entitled to the minimum guarantees of the right to be informed promptly in a language
which the detainee understands,168 the right to communicate with “counsel of his own
choosing,”169 the right to be tried without undue delay,170 the right to defend oneself in
person,171 the right to examine witnesses,172 the right to an interpreter if needed,173 and
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the right to be free from being compelled to testify against oneself.174 These minimum
protections of due process are afforded all people in all circumstances by customary
international law.175
While the ICCPR seeks to protect the rights provided through all of article
fourteen, the language of section three of article fourteen would seem to indicate that a
state could be in accordance article fourteen without providing for all the rights contained
therein. While section three is meant to apply to all people in all sections, the designation
of such privileges as “minimum guarantees” would seem to imply that compliance with
section three would be sufficient to satisfy to article fourteen as a whole.
There may be other provisions of the ICCPR that may apply to the Guantanamo
detainees as well. In particular, the United States may be held to the provisions of article
seven of the ICCPR, which provides protections from “torture” or “cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.”176 In regards to the ICCPR as a whole, there are a
number of provisions in the ICCPR that are more expansive than domestic law. To that
end, there are legitimate reasons for not incorporating every provision of the ICCPR.177
Article fourteen, section three is the exception to that rule. The protections of section
three are necessary for the United States to fulfill its’ international obligations. As such,
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since the United States is a party to the ICCPR, the United States would at the very least
have to apply the provisions of at least section three of article fourteen to the
Guantanamo detainees.

C. Arguments
In a manner consistent with the United States’s declarations concerning the status of
Taliban detainees, instead of being able to definitively determine what status the Al
Qaeda detainees were to be given, the United States only determined what status they
were not to be given. The United States declared that since the Al Qaeda detainees were
members of a terrorist organization and not members of a state party to the Geneva
Conventions, the Al Qaeda detainees were not to be considered prisoners of war.178
The International community provides much greater protections for the Al Qaeda
detainees than United States domestic law. Under international obligations, the Al Qaeda
detainees may be considered “prisoners of war,” and would need to be provided the
protections of Geneva (III). Certainly the Al Qaeda detainees would only be detained so
long as “active hostilities” were continuing.
The best argument lies somewhere in the middle. While it is in the United States’
interests to hold the Al Qaeda detainees as long as they can under the idea that such
detentions may prevent future terrorist attacks, international law provides that such
detention can only last as long as active hostilities persist. This is weighed against the
default rule that in the event of doubt, detainees are to be considered prisoners of war
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under Geneva (III).179 The application of this provision to the Al Qaeda detainees
depends on whether or not one considers the United States as in a de facto state of war
with Al Qaeda. While there are certainly very active military campaigns being conducted
against Al Qaeda organs, it is debatable whether these continuing campaigns constitute a
state of war to justify continuing “active hostilities.” While the United States has
continually denied that it is in a war against Al Qaeda in the strict sense of the idea, the
United States has repeatedly called its campaign against Al Qaeda a “war on terror.” The
United States should consider making the argument that the United States is in a de facto
state of war with Al Qaeda. If the United States is successful in making this argument,
the United States could hold the Al Qaeda detainees for, conceivably, as long as the war
on terror will last. Given the fact that the war on terror looks like it will be here to stay,
the United States could detain Al Qaeda prisoners for a potentially indefinite time
without having to resort to legal creativity.
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5) Al Qaeda Members Captured Abroad or Extradited from Other Territories
A. Status
Domestic Law
Summary
It has been suggested that the capture of Al Qaeda members in areas not directly
involved with the active hostilities of Afghanistan presents an entirely different situation
than any of the other scenarios.180 In fact, there seems to be a judicial gap in this area, as
the contemporary case law that deals with so many different aspects of this debate seems
very quiet in this area.

President’s Military Order of November 13, 2001
The most guidance in the realm domestic law that one can get on the issue of
detainees accused of terrorism who are captured outside Afghanistan is the President’s
Miltary Order of November 13, 2001. The order was aptly named “Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism.”181
In the Military Order, the President details a clear definition of the individuals
subject to the Military Order. In particular, the Military Order explicitly declares that the
Order shall apply to non-citizens, who the United States has reason to believe, have either
participated in or supported acts of international terrorism or have knowingly harbored
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persons who have participated in such activity.182 Through this provision of the Military
Order, the President has declared the legality of the jurisdiction of military commissions
over any person that the United States has reason to believe has participated in some
supportive act of terrorism. This Military Order applies not only in Afghanistan, but also
throughout the world.183 The President has delegated the authority to enforce the
provisions of the order, as well as the authority to conduct trials of individuals subject to
the order, through section four of the Military Order.184

International Law
Summary
The status of detainees accused of being members of Al Qaeda is similarly up for debate, although
the standards to be applied to the Al Qaeda detainees are quite different. Since those detainees are not
captured pursuant to “active hostilities,” the analysis is going to be much different. It is difficult to argue
that the Al Qaeda detainees deserve prisoner of war status, and the Geneva (III) protections that accompany
such status. Al Qaeda detainees may be more properly termed enemy combatants, but that does not mean
that the Al Qaeda detainees may be denied all protections of international law.
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While the applicability of the Geneva Conventions may be debatable, once again these particular
detainees are entitled to protections under the ICCPR and the Convention Against Torture. The Al Qaeda
detainees are afforded basic humane treatment and minimum protections of due process under the ICCPR
and they are entitled freedom from torture in accordance with the Convention Against Torture.

Geneva Convention (IV)
It has been suggested that persons captured pursuant to a war on terror should be
considered enemy combatants and are entitled protections under the Geneva Convention
Relative to Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War [“Geneva (IV)”].185 In order
for an enemy combatant to fall under the protection of Geneva (IV), the enemy
combatant must be considered a “protected person” under the Convention.186 Geneva
(IV) draws a fine distinction between those that may be considered “protected persons”
under the Convention and those that cannot be considered “protected persons.” Article
four defines “protected persons” as people who “find themselves…in the hands of a Party
to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.”187 This vague
provision would seem to suggest that a “protected person” under article four would be
one who is not a national of the occupied state, but “finds” themselves fighting for the
occupied state. Article four exempts from the class of protected persons those people
who are either nationals of a neutral state in the territory of a belligerent state or those
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people who are nationals of associated belligerent states.188 Persons in this class who do
not qualify as “protected persons” are not subject to the protections of Geneva (IV).
This view can be contrasted with an alternative interpretation of the Geneva
Conventions. It has also been suggested that persons who are captured outside of a
territory of active hostilities and have no direct relationship to said active hostilities are
not entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions.189 Persons falling in this
category would not be subject to either Geneva (III), which only applies to prisoners of
war, or Geneva (IV), which would only apply to protected persons.

B. Protections
Domestic Law
Summary
Again, the treatment of international terrorism in American case law is rather
sparse; to this point American courts have not had to deal with the protections afforded
such accused terrorists to any significant degree. In regards to the protections currently
afforded detainees accused of supporting international terrorism, the President’s Military
Order of November 13, 2001 provides the most guidance.

President’s Military Order of November 13, 2001
There are two specific sections of the President’s Military Order that provide
certain protections for individuals who are brought before military commissions on
allegations in international terrorism.
188
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The protections afforded the detainees captured subject to the President’s Military
Order of November 13, 2001 can be divided into two types of protections. First, section
three outlines the treatment privileges and protections to be afforded the detainees subject
to the jurisdiction of the military commissions. In particular, the detainees are to be
treated humanely without discrimination, are to be afforded adequate food and medical
treatment and are to be allowed free exercise of their religions.190 Second, section four of
the Military Order outlines the procedural protections afforded the detainees before the
military commissions. Under section four, the individuals detained under the Military
Order are to be brought before military commissions that may sit at any time and place
that the Secretary of Defense may determine.191 The detainees are to be afforded a full
and fair trial, rules of evidence to the extent that such evidence would have value to a
reasonable person, conviction and sentencing by a two-thirds majority of the members of
the commission, and review by the President or the Secretary of Defense.192

International Law
Summary
The scope of protections due the individuals detained for reasons of support of
international terrorism again depends on whether or not the Geneva Conventions apply to
the class of persons accused of supporting international terrorism. Whether or not the
Geneva Conventions apply, the relevant provisions of the ICCPR and the Convention
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Against Torture will still apply minimum protections, as they do to all persons in all
circumstances.

Geneva Conventions
The protections afforded detainees accused of being members of terrorist
organizations will depend on the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the case at
hand.
If one accepts the argument that a person accused of supporting terrorism can be
considered a protected person under Geneva (IV), the protections of Geneva (IV) would
apply to those persons. In the case of a detainee who is determined to be a “protected
person” under Geneva (IV), the detainee would be entitled to a number of procedural and
substantive protections. Among other rights and privileges, such persons are free from
“physical or moral coercion” for interrogative purposes.193 Protected persons are also
afforded the opportunity to present witnesses at trial,194 a punishment proportionate to the
offense,195 as well as the right to appeal.196
If one were to accept the view that persons captured outside active hostilities are
not “protected persons” under Geneva (IV), such persons would not be subject to any of
the protections of the Geneva Convetions. This would mean that such detainees would
not be covered under the “cessation of active hostilities” protection. If this were indeed
193
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the case, the state holding the detainee could conceivably detain the person for an
indefinite time without violating the person’s rights and privileges under international
law.197

C. Arguments
There are very serious arguments on both sides of the debate as to the protections
afforded individuals detained for allegations of supporting international terrorism.
The argument advanced by the United States takes the view that the detention of such
individuals is necessary to protect the national security of the United States. The policy
of the United States is particularly driven by a desire to prevent another attack from
occurring, no matter what the procedural costs may present. The President’s Military
Order declares as much: “have determined that an extraordinary emergency exists for
national defense purposes, that this emergency constitutes an urgent and compelling
government interest, and that issuance of this order is necessary to meet the
emergency.”198
There has been fear of widespread constitutional violations of due process in the
pursuit of the War on Terrorism, most of which has come from the media and the
international community.199 As if recognizing this criticism, American authorities have
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tried to codify the constitiutional protections to be afforded the individuals subject to the
military commissions. The United States has declared that it will provide for the humane
treatment of the detainees without discrimination, the provision of adequate food and
medical treatment, and the protection of free exercise of their religions. 200 Procedurally
speaking, the United States has declared that it will provide the detainees a full and fair
trial, rules of evidence to the extent that such evidence would have value to a reasonable
person, conviction and sentencing by a two-thirds majority of the members of the
commission, and some measure of review by the President or the Secretary of Defense.
201

The international community continues to express it’s concern for what it sees as
a series of activities aimed at denying individuals their rights under domestic and
international law. The international community has taken particular issue with the
provision of death penalties for the individuals facing military commissions, the lack of
judicial oversight of the military commission’s decisions, and the prorated rules of
evidence provided for by the military commissions.202 There is a very real fear
throughout the international community that the military commissions will subvert the
textbook at Tab 35]. Not all the analysis was negative, however. The Washington Post praised the
commissions soon after the commissions began: “On the positive side, pretrial hearings for four detainees
have begun, and the detainees are being given a chance to respond to the serious allegations against them.
The members of the commission and its prosecutors and defense teams alike appeared to take their roles
and duties seriously. Defense challenges to the service of officers on the five-member commissions yielded
candid exchanges. For all the criticism the commissions have taken from human rights groups and others,
they did not appear to be kangaroo courts in which the results are preordained.” (The Tribunals Begin, The
Washington Post, August 29, 2004) [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab 37].
200

President’s Military Order, supra note 52, at 57834.

201

President’s Military Order, supra note 52, at 57834.

202

See generally Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper on U.S. Military
Commissions, (Jun 25, 2003) [Reproduced in the accompanying textbook at Tab 46], and Human Rights,
Watch, U.S.: Commission Rules Meet Some, Not All Rights Concerns, (Mar. 21 2002) [Reproduced in the
accompanying textbook at Tab 47], available at http://hrw.org/press/2002/03/tribunals0321.htm (last
accessed on October 4, 2004).
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rule of law worldwide, and that the protections that should be afforded the detainees
under international law will be disregarded.
While the legal concerns of the international community are important to
consider, particularly the concerns about the death penalty, the length of detentions and
the lack of judicial appeal, the protections provided by the United States should be
enough to satisfy its obligations under international law. The provisions of the
President’s Military Order of November 13, 2001, as well as the provisions released by
the Department of Defense concerning the protections to be afforded in the military
commissions, should be enough as a whole to satisfy the minimum protections of equality
under the ICCPR. Furthermore, so long as the United States continues to honor its
commitment to provide the detainees with humane treatment, the United States should be
able to comply with the Geneva Conventions and the Convention Against Torture.
Therefore, while the Al Qaeda detainees are most definitely afforded certain
constitutional protections through incorporation of international law, the United States
has taken the necessary steps to comply with the minimum protections that must be
afforded the Al Qaeda detainees
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